

### (intel)

## **Network Security for Containerized** Applications



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### Agenda

Kubernetes and SDN Choices

OpenShift and OpenShift SDN

Typical network security questions on an Enterprise Cluster

- Restricting traffic across tiers
- Handling network zones and isolation
- Securing Egress
- Securing Ingress
- Securing communications between Nodes
- Application Network Security




# Kubernetes is a clear winner in the world of Container Orchestration and Management

### WHAT DOES IT TAKE TO MAKE K8S ENTERPRISE READY?

How do I support my K8S cluster? version upgrades, fixes/patches etc

You'll need a lot more on your cluster than Kubernetes itself..

Kubernetes



### K8S REQUIRES A SECURE ENTERPRISE GRADE LINUX CONTAINER HOST

Kubernetes

Red Hat Enterprise Linux or Red Hat CoreOS

### K8S CLUSTER REQUIRES NETWORKING AND STORAGE SOLUTIONS

Software Defined Network, Storage Solution


Kubernetes (CNI, CSI)

Red Hat Enterprise Linux or Red Hat CoreOS

## **Software Defined Network Choices**

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### For Network solution, K8S uses CNI



### K8S CLUSTER REQUIRES LIFECYCLE MGMT FOR DEVELOPERS AND OPERATORS


Developer Console, Operations Console, Lifecycle Mgmt, Automated Operations

Software Defined Network, Storage

Kubernetes (CNI, CSI)

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### YOU'LL NEED CONTAINER REGISTRY, LOGGING, METRICS, CHARGEBACK CAPABILITIES




Developer Console, Operations Console, Lifecycle Mgmt, Automated Operations

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### YOU'LL NEED TO **STANDARDIZE** ON MIDDLEWARE, A SERVICE CATALOG, AND MICROSERVICE MGMT



Developer Console, Operations Console, Lifecycle Mgmt, Automated Operations


Software Defined Network, Storage

Kubernetes (CNI, CSI)

Red Hat Enterprise Linux or Red Hat CoreOS

\*coming soon

### DEVELOPERS NEED IDES, BUILD MGMT, CICD, DEBUGGING FEATURES AND MORE..




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Software Defined Network, Storage


Kubernetes (CNI, CSI)

Red Hat Enterprise Linux or Red Hat CoreOS

### THIS MAKES A REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE FOR ENTERPRISE KUBERNETES aka OPENSHIFT



### **OPENSHIFT NETWORK PLUGINS**



\* Coming as default in OCP 4.1

\*\* Flannel is minimally verified and is supported only and exactly as deployed in the OpenShift on OpenStack reference architecture


## **Typical Network Questions**

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## 1. Restricting traffic across tiers

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### **Traffic Restrictions Across Application Tiers**



Allowed connections

**Disallowed connections** 

How can we restrict traffic across Application Tiers?

### **Network Policy Objects**

#### Enables Microsegmentation


Allows configuring individual policies at the Pod Level

Apply to ingress traffic for pods and services

Allows restricting traffic between the pods within a project/namespace

Allows traffic to specific pods from other projects/namespaces


### **Network Policy Objects**




Example Policies


- Allow all traffic inside the project
- Allow traffic from green to gray
- Allow traffic to purple on 8080

apiVersion: extensions/v1beta1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-to-purple-on-8080
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
color: purple
ingress:
- ports:
- protocol: tcp
port: 8080







### Network Policy Objects to Rescue



### Start with Default Deny




### Add Network Policies To Allow Specific Incoming



## 2. Isolating zones

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### Network Zones separated by Firewalls



External traffic allowed to touch DMZ

Holes punched in firewalls to allow specific traffic from

DMZ to Application Zone


and from

Application Zone to Data Zone

How do I setup K8S/OpenShift here?

### Option 1: OpenShift cluster per Zone






Useful to demonstrate compliance with Security Standards and Regulations

Additional actions needed to protect Master APIs, and other URLs in DMZ that are not supposed to be exposed to Internet

Cost of maintenance is high

### **Option 2: OpenShift Cluster covering Multiple Zones**



Application pods run on one Cluster. Microsegmented with Network Security policies.


Infra Nodes in each zone run Ingress and Egress pods for specific zones

If required, physical isolation of pods to specific nodes is possible with node-selectors. But that defeats the purpose of a shared cluster. Microsegmentation with SDN is the way to go.

## 3. Securing Egress

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
### **Connecting via External Service**




Application connecting to External System talks to an External Service whose Endpoint is set as Destination IP & Port Or a Fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the external system and port

But, what if we have a firewall in front of the External System that allows only Specific IPs?


### **Connecting via Egress Router**



### Static IP for all traffic from a Project




### Static IP for all traffic from a Project



High availability scenario

### **Egress Firewall to Limit Access**

Cluster admin can limit the external addresses accessed by some or all pods



Examples:

A pod can talk to hosts (outside OpenShift cluster) but cannot connect to public internet

A pod can talk to public internet, but cannot connect to hosts (outside OpenShift cluster)




A pod cannot reach specific subnets/hosts

## 4. Securing Ingress

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## **OpenShift Router as Ingress**




## **Route Specific IP Whitelists**

- Restrict access to a route to a select IP address(es)
- Annotate the route with the whitelisted/allowed IP addresses
- Connections from any other IPs are blocked

```
metadata:
annotations:
haproxy.router.openshift.io/ip_whitelist: 192.168.1.10 192.168.1.11
```

What about ingress traffic on ports that are not 80 or 443?

## Using NodePort as Ingress to Service



Binds service to a unique port on every node in the cluster

Port randomly assigned or optionally picked from port range 30000-32767


All nodes act as ingress point at the port assigned

Every node in the cluster redirects traffic to service service endpoints even if a corresponding pod is not running on that node

Firewall rules should not prevent nodes listening on these ports

Every exposed service uses up a port on all the nodes in a cluster. Are there alternatives?

## Assigning External IP to a Service with Ingress



Admin defines ExternalIP address range. Assigns these extra IPs to nodes.


OpenShift assigns both internal IP and external IP to a service. Or a specific External IP can be chosen.

Node to which ExternalIP is assigned acts as the ingress point to the service.

ExternalIP can be a VIP. You can set up ipfailover to reassign VIP to other nodes. Ipfailover runs as a privileged pod and handles VIP assignment.

# 5. Securing communications between nodes

## Secured Communications between Hosts




Secures cluster communications with IPsec

- Encryption between all Master and Node hosts (L3)
- Uses OpenShift CA and existing certificates
- Simple setup via policy defn
  - Groups (e.g. subnets)
  - Individual hosts

## 6. Security at Application Level

## SSL at Ingress (with OpenShift Routes)



## Layer 7 Application Security

Application specific monitoring East-West container traffic

Web Application Firewalls

Granular traffic control, Packet Inspections

Denial of Service, Ransomware, Viruses Detection and Mitigation

Runtime Security, Forensics, Incident capture, Audits, Alerts

Container runtime monitoring


#### **Partner Solutions**



aqua

# 7. (Tech Preview) Application network security with Istio

## Istio Concepts - Sidecar Proxy




#### SideCar Proxy

- Intercepts all network communication between microservices
- Encapsulates Service Infrastructure code
- Application code (business logic) unaware of Sidecar proxy
- Examples Linkerd, Envoy

## Istio Concepts - Service Mesh

#### **Network of Microservices**




Service Mesh is a dedicated infrastructure layer to handle service-service communications

Typically implemented as an array of lightweight network proxies deployed alongside application code

Interconnected Proxies form a mesh network


## Istio Service Mesh on OpenShift



Connect, Manage, and Secure Microservices, transparently

- Intelligent Routing
- Load Balancing
- Service Resilience
- Telemetry and Reporting
- Policy Enforcement
- Content based Filtering (Layer 7)
- mTLS between services
- East-West traffic control

## Application Traffic Encryption with Istio Auth (Future)



Uses Service Account as Identity. SPIFFE Id format

spiffe://<domain>/ns/<namespace>/sa/<serviceaccount>

Mutual TLS between sidecars

Istio CA

- Generate cert pair and SPIFFE key for each SA
- Distribute key and cert pairs
- Rotate keys and certs periodically
- Revoke key and cert when need


## Questions?



## THANK YOU

## **OpenShift SDN Overview**

## Kubernetes uses CNI



\* Coming as default in OCP 4.1

\*\* Flannel is minimally verified and is supported only and exactly as deployed in the OpenShift on OpenStack reference architecture

## **OpenShift Networking**

Software Defined Networking (SDN) for pod-pod communication

- Configures overlay network using Open vSwitch (OVS)
- Three types of plugins
  - **ovs-subnet** : flat network every pod can talk to every other pod
  - ovs-multitenant: project level isolation for pod-pod communication.
    Unique VNID per project

You can join projects to get them the same VNID

'default' project (VNID 0) privileged to communicate with other pods

- **ovs-networkpolicy**: fine-grained isolation using network policy objects

## **OpenShift Installation Defaults**

Cluster network CIDR: 10.128.0.0/14

Gives 32-14=18 bits or the ip address range of 10.128.0.0 - 10.131.255.255

Host subnet length: 9 bits (32-9=23)


Subnet for each node is /23. Gets 512 ip addresses per node.

Leaves 9 bits for nodes ((32-9)-14=9). Allows  $2^9=512$  subnets that can be assigned to nodes

**Subnets**: 10.128.0.0/23, 10.128.2.0/23, ...10.131.254.0/23

Master Portal Net (services): 172.30.0.0/16

## **OpenShift SDN manages Node Registry**




Master allocates a subnet to the node.

Node creation - Allocated subnet added to Node Registry

Node deletion - subnet removed from the Node Registry

On node creation, SDN registers the host with the SDN master

## OpenShift SDN configures network devices on Node



**br0** Pod containers attached to this ovs bridge device. Non subnet specific flow rules on br0


**tun0** For external network access via NAT. Cluster subnet gateway address assigned. Configures netfilter and routing rules.

vxlan0 Access to other nodes. OVS VxLAN device

additional node added:


- Watch subnet updates from master
- Add OpenFlow rules on br0 to push traffic to the newly added subnet go to vxlan0

## **OpenShift SDN Pod Creation**



- Assigns an available ip address from the node's cluster subnet to the pod
- Attaches host side of pod's veth interface pair to br0
- Adds OpenFlow rules to OVS DB to route traffic addressed to the new pod to correct OVS port
- For ovs-multitenant, adds OpenFlow rules
  - to attach pod's VNID to outgoing traffic
  - allow traffic to pod when VNID matches

## Pod to Pod Traffic - Both pods on the same Node




\* Peer vEthernet device for container A is named ethA and for container B is named ethB

## Pod to Pod Traffic - Pods on two different Nodes

Flow of traffic

eth0(in A's netns) - vethA - br0 - vxlan0 - network - vxlan0 - br0- vethB - eth0(in B's netns)




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
## Pod to External Systems outside OpenShift

Flow of traffic

eth0(in A's netns) - vethA - br0 - tun0 - (NAT) - eth0(physical device) - Internet




Kubernetes/OpenShift Core Concepts Pods



Openshift/K8S runs containers in Pods. Pod is a wrapper


Each pod gets an IP address. Container adopts Pod's IP.

## **Containers in Pods**



Some pods may have more than one container .. that's a special case though!! Usually these containers are dependent like a master and slave or side-car pattern And they have a very tight married relationship All the containers in a pod die along with a pod.


## Pod Scaling




when you scale up your application, you are scaling up pods.

Each Pod has its own IP.


### Nodes






Nodes are the application hosts that make up a Openshift/K&S cluster. They run docker and Openshift. Master controls where the pods are deployed on the nodes, and ensures cluster health.

## High Availability



when you scale up, pods are distributed across nodes following scheduler policies defined by the administrator. So even if a node fails, the application is still available

## Health Management




Not just that, if a pod dies for some reason, another pod will come in its place


## Flexibility of architecture with Openshift/ K8S Services

Pods can be front-ended by a Service. Service is a proxy.. Every node knows about it. Service gets an IP

Service knows which pods to frontend based on the labels.



## **Built-in Service Discovery**



Clients can talk to the service. Service redirects the requests to the pods.

Service also gets a DNS Name

Client can discover service... built in service discovery!!

Accessing your Application

